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Is there an alternative to the dominant Western model of atomized egoic subjectivity? If there is, 
is it possible to ontologically (re)ground this alternate model of subjectivity in a relational 
alterity? In this paper, I answer in the affirmative. I offer this possibility by considering, ontic-
ontologically, an other-than-egoic conception of the subject of the socio-Symbolic domain, 
through Julia Kristeva’s theory of dual signification (comprising both semiotic and Symbolic 
systems). This theory is found in Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) and is deepened through 
her later work Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1980). Through these—and the 
psychoanalytic and signifying theories that underpin them—I demonstrate how such an 
alternative is possible due to a shared originary (re)grounding negativity, which is to be 
understood as the differential precondition for both subject formation and signification. In so 
doing, I offer a provisional theory of social solidarity which has at its basis a critique of egoic 
subjectivity and bourgeois ideology found in discourses of the (Western) subject and its socio-
Symbolic representation.  
Such a critique is guided by the Freudian and Kleinian psychoanalytic model of 
subjectivity (comprising both conscious and unconscious systems), and in terms of signifying 
practice, by the Lacanian structuralist developments of psychoanalysis. I trace these threads in 
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and through Kristeva’s theory of signification to foreground a conception of socio-Symbolic 
subjective representation that is not predicated upon an egoic identity, alone. This offers a novel 
way to think being-with as structurally fundamental and always already inscribed in the very 
processes of subject formation and signification. By showing how language and subject 
formation are predicated upon a dual signification and dyadic psychic-structure, respectively, I 
reveal how such structures—as dual processes—open up other ways of enframing the world. 
The concern for the o/Other reveals these as grounded in what I call the “anterior negativity” of 
the relation to the Other, thereby inscribing the subject into socio-Symbolic structures that are 
neither linearly determined nor exclusionary. Such negativity is therefore foundational of the 
position of social relationality I contend grants the possibility for a subjective-Symbolic theory 
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Even at the innermost heart of interiority, it is always irruption of the outside, exteriority shaking 
everything. The encounter pierces the world, pierces the self; and in this opening, everything that 
happens, not happening (coming about with the status of what has not arrived) is the reverse side 
that cannot be lived of what on the right side cannot be written: a double impossibility that by a 
supplementary act—a fraud, a kind of falsehood, also a madness—must be transformed in order 
to adapt it to living and writing “reality.” 
—Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation  
 
 
The way in which mortals, called out of the dif-ference into the dif-ference, speak on their own 
part, is: by responding. Mortal speech must first of all have listened to the command, in the form 
of which the stillness of the dif-ference calls world and things into the rift of its onefold 
simplicity.  
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This essay explores socio-Symbolic subject formation and signification through a shared concern 
with what I call the “anterior negativity” of differential production. This shared concern operates 
in the work of Julia Kristeva and Melanie Klein. Such a concern with this interaction will offer a 
provisional theory of solidarity, as set out in a Kristevan-Kleinian model of subjectivity and 
signification. Indeed, my main contention is that social solidarity is inherent ontologically, to the 
very structures of subject formation and signification. This is first, because the human subject is 
a subject of language, and so such a formation then ought to be taken through the process of 
signification. While the subject has to carry a certain representational value (i.e., that the “self” 
of individuation and enunciation be understood and carry a sense of what-ness in the socio-
Symbolic domain), I thus second, will show that this value is not predicated upon a rigid egoic 
identity alone, nor is it wholly determined by the phallic law of signifying mastery. This means 
that these ontological structures are open to other ways of enframing the world, and that such a 
mode of differing inheres in the very modality by which the subject and signification come to 
represent.  
If such structures are more fundamentally open to change, this is because from the start 
they are not merely predicated upon an egoic psychic structure or an exclusionary Symbolic 
system. In turn, this is because such structures are malleable and changeable due to an originary 
grounding negativity, which is an anterior occurrence and yet in no way pre-exists. In terms of 
subject formation, this is demonstrated in the Kleinian model of psychic development, whereby 
subjectivity is grounded in pre-Oedipal and Oedipal object relations, recovering the Freudian 
thesis of negativity—understood as the death instinct—as the basis for psychic life. In terms of 
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signification, the Kristevan dual authority of signification refers to semiotic and Symbolic 
systems in language, where the semiotic motility is the force of “anterior negativity” that 
breaches the Symbolic authority of the signifying system. This theory of signification is 
primarily found through Kristeva’s Revolution in Poetic Language (1974) and is deepened 
through her later work Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1980). By negativity, I mean 
the differential force of negativity (distinct from negation) which functions as an anterior 
structure for ontic-ontological production (of signification, and of subject formation).1  
This differing process of back and forth, as an oscillation, emerges through and between 
ontological and ontic temporality in signifying practices. To be sure, ontological time is the time 
of Being qua Being (as infinite, distinct from ontic existential time) and semiotic time is the time 
of (temporally finite) beings. These two modalities of temporalization are not merely 
compossible. Their friction generates a temporal tension between the dual processes of 
representation. Because such processes are predicated upon dual systems of representation—and 
so the ἀρχή emerges between and through two co-constitutive referents—it thus demonstrates the 
insufficiency of a grounding ipseity or phallic Symbolic function.2 Such a temporal tension 
thusly isolates the impossibility of locating an ἀρχή generative of the origin of the subject, which 
therefore rightly directs the focus toward the dual processes of subject formation and 
signification, which we find in a Kristevan-Kleinian model. 
In unpacking this, the remainder of this paper will consider the problematic which 
includes the subject (consisting of conscious and unconscious processes) and signification (here 
referring to the semiotic and Symbolic systems). These dual processes are split by the so-called 
inner world (that of psychic life) and outer world (that of representation). This thesis will take 
these moments and treat them in the manner below, so as to grasp—however provisionally—the 
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theory of social solidarity I contend we can find through them. While this task may at first glance 
seem to involve logics and spheres of focus that seem incommensurable—and this preliminary 
remark is not going to resolve that—I will simply give the basic form of the thesis so that it can 
be readily understood. These logics, as I will demonstrate, in fact overlap and interweave in 
fundamental ways that underscore my main argument, which is that a theory of social solidarity 
is inherent ontologically into the structures of subject formation and signification because of a 
shared grounding in a differential “anterior negativity.”  
In the first section, I present the Freudian thesis of the death instinct as originary psychic 
negativity. Both Klein and Kristeva posit the Freudian negativity as the basis for signifying 
processes and subject formation. The Freudian problematic will be retrieved through the frame of 
the twentieth century (post-)structuralist French tradition, in particular, through the (middle 
period) of Jacques Lacan. 3 The Lacanian developments clarify the Freudian position by giving 
Symbolic function to the unconscious. This will later form a key part of Kristeva’s theory of dual 
signification. Before I can reach Kristeva’s theory, however, I must first give an overview of the 
Freudian thesis. This will give the methodological, definitional groundwork to subsequently 
develop my contention that by taking seriously the negativity problematic in subject formation 
and signification there emerges a way to conceptualize—ontologically—a provisional theory of 
social solidarity.  
The second section takes up the problematic of Freudian negativity through a more 
radical formulation, found in the work of Melanie Klein. The Freudian concept of negativity is 
foundational in the Kleinian school, which posits the concept as the basis for signifying power 
and subjectivity in object relations. It thus demonstrates the psychic, structural, developmental, 
and linguistic relevance of the negativity of the telic rupture originally posited by Freud. Klein 
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positions the death instinct at the developmental basis of pre-Oedipal and Oedipal life—without 
which reparative sublation is unthinkable. In this way negativity gives the grounds for the 
(dyadic) structure of the psyche. The Kleinian psychic structure is dyadic because the pre-
Oedipal and Oedipal object relations are always already oriented toward the world, and its 
(part/whole) objects. This therefore demonstrates the crucial position of relationality, giving the 
ethico-political value in socio-Symbolic subject formation.  
By way of conclusion, the final section will synthesize the results from the above and 
offer the possibility for a social theory of solidarity, by taking seriously the “social as a 
signifying space” (Kristeva 1984 49). This signifying process, however, must always 
demonstrate the dual authority of signification (including the semiotic). This duality without a 
dualism allows the socio-Symbolic to be capable of change, re-articulation, and novel ways of 
enframing the world. Through this novel consideration of subjective and signifying relationality, 
ontologically, I am able to demonstrate a theory of solidarity that offers a way to think being-
with as structurally fundamental and always already inscribed in and through the structures by 
which language and subjectivity represent. To be sure, the ontological concern of Kristeva’s 
recovery of the negativity problematic in theories of subject formation and signification has not 
yet been fully appreciated in recent scholarship.4 It is for this reason that I turn my attention 
toward it. I hope that by tracing the (middle period) Lacanian (and so therefore by implication, 
Heideggerian) and Freudian roots to which such an ontological structure in Kristeva’s work is 
indebted, I can retrieve it from solely ontic concerns of the speaking-subject at the level of the 
atomized egoic subject, merely. Thus, ontologically, such a theory offers an other-than-egoic 
conception of the subject. Therefore, her relationship to o/Others in and through the very means 
of representability and relationality is one of relational alterity.
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I. Psychic Negativity and Symbolic Subject Formation in Freud and Lacan 
 
In this section I reveal insight into the Freudian concept of the death instinct as anterior psychic 
negativity. As is characteristic of Freud’s later work, such a concept is operative through the 
interest of self-preservation. In this period Freud posits a dual theory of instincts: those of life 
and death. The negativity that Freud assigns to the death instinct has an ‘impossible’ origin: we 
only know that it functions as a response to trauma through the dual theory of the instincts of 
Eros and Thanatos. It is therefore neither a biological concept nor the effect of a prior causal 
sequence. Rather, the so-called trauma occurs at the moment of splitting (Spaltung) between self 
and Other in the process of psychic constitution—between the inner (Innenwelt) and outer 
(Umwelt) worlds. It is therefore a structural psychic condition and so, paradoxically, is what 
gives the psyche the very possibility of persisting. By grappling with the opacities in the Freudian 
schema and by approaching the problematic by way of its structural relevance, I will 
demonstrate how anterior negativity in the psychoanalytic model, originally posited by Freud 
establishes the constitutive ontological grounds for socio-Symbolic subject formation and the 
relational alterity found within the psychic structure in its relation to the outer world.  
I proceed with an exegetical reading of Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” looking 
back from the Lacanian structuralist developments characteristic of Lacan’s middle period. This 
period clearly foregrounds the Heideggerian problematic of language and subject formation on 
ontological grounds, taken through structural linguistics. This Lacanian development will secure 
the foundations for my later insights into Symbolic articulation and solidarity as specific 
derivations of the negativity problematic understood through the psychoanalytic psychic 
structure and its representation in signification.  
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I.I. Freud’s Death Instinct—The Telic Spaltung 
 
Historically, the question concerning anterior negativity in the psychoanalytic tradition finds its 
origin in the Freudian concept of the death instinct.5 Freud’s metapsychological account in 
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” offers the death instinct as the irrepressible force of psychic 
negativity that gives limits to the psychic structure (at the moment of encountering the outer 
world of representation), and yet crucially fails to contain it. This failure produces an 
irresolvable tension; such tension can be mapped on to the antipodal schema of pleasure-
unpleasure, which constitutes the very basic processes of psychic life, demonstrated in the 
thematic foci operative through the dual theory of the instincts in binding (i.e., what grounds the 
inner life of the mind in thetic intentionality) and (unbound) repetition.6  
As the analytic observation of repetition-compulsion evinces (through the discovery of 
this negative instinct), there is no originary “trauma” to identify as an ἀρχή, as there is always 
already a psychic inscription for the trauma to return to, insofar as the death instinct is the 
limiting (telic) force of the psychic structure. This irresolvable origin, as the principle of anterior 
futurity to the inscriptive site—as the site of so-called originary trauma—emerges at the moment 
of ontologically distinguishing between subject/Other.7 Thus, the trauma of the originary 
severance (between subject and object, “self” and “other”) propels the subject through life, 
remaining an ever-incomplete (re)search. Such a temporal consideration of repetition and 
propulsion transforms the problematic of anterior negativity into an ontological recovery of the 
possibility of absence and void, presence and withdrawal, operative at the psychic bounds. This 
dually oriented recovery contains and yet, crucially fails to master, what will become the excess 
of repressive psychic force. 
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As such, the death instinct repeats the (return of) irrepressible psychic trauma. It is 
helpful to recall that for Freud repetition is tied with a constitutive trauma. Trauma may be 
defined as “any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the 
protective shield [of the interior]” (Freud 1961 33). Trauma thus functions as a “breach in an 
otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli” which thus suspends the function and mastery of 
the pleasure principle (1961 33). The pleasure principle, then, no longer holds its position of 
primacy. For, if the death instinct is a response to breaching stimuli, then paradoxically it is what 
gives the psyche the very possibility of persisting. In fact, it invests efforts to reduce psychic 
tension through the dual function of release and inertial self-preservation in attempts to lower 
tensions in and of the psychic system in the process of somatization. Indeed, the “dominating 
tendency of mental life […] is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension 
due to stimuli” (1961 67). Paradoxically, however, the death instinct also demonstrates an 
increase in psychic tension encountered in the repetitions of traumatic stimuli. Thus, the death 
instinct understood as a response to trauma generates an increase in psychic tension, establishing 
the link between (unbound) repetition in traumatic neuroses.  
As Thanatos, the death instinct interrupts the posited sense of harmonious freely flowing 
energetics of the pleasure principle in and of psychic life. Thus, it breaches the self-preservatory 
mechanism of the pleasure principle, but this is emphatically neither an outward desire for 
aggression (though it may be the basis for aggressivity), nor a mortuary desire-for-death. 
Although the death instinct is coupled with the libidinous energetics governed by Eros,8 
ontologically, and crucial to my overall argument, the death instinct functions as the non-Being 
(qua negativity) out of and through which being manifests, which thus allows the being to 
temporally (in the dyadic finite-infinite model) persist in itself. Such negativity, as Kristeva 
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demonstrates, “constitutes the logical impetus beneath the thesis of negation and that of the 
negation of negation, but is identical to neither since it is, instead, the logical functioning of the 
movement that produces the theses” (Kristeva 1984 109). It is “the liquefying and dissolving 
agent that does not destroy but rather reactivates new organizations and, in that sense, affirms” 
(1984 109). This “reactivating” organizational negativity is indeed a necessary structural 
condition of and for the psyche and its relation to the outer world, and to the alterity of the 
o/Other.  
Structurally, the psyche has within it the capacity for primary processes (i.e., the unbound 
unconscious, driven by the “pleasure principle”) and secondary processes (i.e., thetic 
intentionality, bound in the conscious processes of normal waking life, governed by the “reality 
principle”) which constitute the life of the mind, mediated in and through the split (Spaltung) 
between inner and outer worlds. This split demonstrates—in terms of subject-formation—an 
irrecuperable tension, as it sets up a barrier as a protective (as well as projective) shield, which 
serves the function of unifying the psyche. Such a split, Freud maintains, as the basis of psychic 
life, carries a wound—an originary trauma—which is understood as the differentiation between 
subject/Other which lies always already before the posited subject.9  
To be sure, initially the pleasure principle—as the force of Eros, as libido—seeks “to 
establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—in short, to bind together” (Freud 1940 
148). What this binding process in mental cathexis—taking place between primary and 
secondary processes—demonstrates is the pleasure principle’s primary aim to lower and 
maintain (indeed, master) the excitatory incursions upon the mental apparatus. Thus, the primacy 
of a “beyond” in psychic life has to take place prior to the reality principle in binding, and as 
such, “is a preparatory act which introduces and assures the dominance of the pleasure principle” 
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through the ego exerting mastery. However, in a dialectical turn, Freud claims “the pleasure 
principle seems actually to serve the death instincts” (Freud 1961 77).  
For the pleasure principle to function as a governing force, the reality principle would 
have to suspend the pleasure principle in order to serve an undetermined futural point where the 
pleasure being sought may be more appropriate. There is thus a deferred (dual and indeed 
temporal) nature to pleasure, for such pleasure cannot simply function as unbridled excess in the 
present: it must be withheld and sustained for future release so that the being can persevere in 
itself. This, however, cannot go on ad infinitum because beings are temporal, hence the death 
instinct qua negativity gains primacy. The death instinct is thus the telic force that ruptures the 
psychic system originally posited to be governed by pleasure and kept under control by a 
principle of constancy. 
Controversially, Freud evinces it is “the most universal endeavour of all living 
substance—namely to return to the quiescence of the inorganic world” that impels psychic life 
onward—albeit through self-preservatory defenses and self-destructive and outwardly directed 
aggressive detours (Freud 1961 71). Such a formulation of a desire to return (pour la 
recherché)—as a repetition—would appear to have at its basis, in this formulation, a desire for 
regression. Surely the sense of repetition could not be solely constituted by regression—or else, 
why is it that there is anything at all? 
Above we established dual signification in Freud. This duality forms the basis of the 
Lacanian suggestion that there is indeed no (natural) subject, but only the signifying function of 
the unconscious, as the subject, and also desire. To anticipate, the shift to the signifying 
process—to use Kristeva’s term—of the subject problematizes the sense of a so-called natural 
“subject” insofar as the subject of the unconscious is also therefore a desire, a subject of 
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language. This is a moment on which Kristeva dwells. As she puts it, the process considers 
psychic negativity as “separate from the body proper and, at the very moment of separation, fixes 
it in place as absent, as a sign […] as signifiable (which is to say, already taken on as an object 
within the signifying system and as subordinate to the subject who posits it through the sign)” 
(Kristeva 1984 123). From this vantage point, my paper then takes its orientation out of 
Kristevan process philosophy, which is indebted to Lacan. 
 
I.II. Negativity Restructured: The Lacanian Symbolic 
 
In her late work Melanie Klein (2001) Kristeva reiterates how Lacan’s “epistemological lucidity, 
which sets forth his views on the role of the symbolic in constructing the subject, emphasizes 
language and verbalization. Not only is it speech that, particularly in psychoanalysis, structures 
the subject…” (Kristeva 2001 174). Speech, and the structure of it, thereby masters the subject of 
the unconscious in the Lacanian account: because of “the simple fact that language, prior to 
signifying something, signifies to someone” (Lacan 2006 83); and because “the signifier alone 
guarantees the theoretical coherence” of the subject (Lacan 2006 414). Here, Lacan’s now-
famous catchphrase that the “unconscious is structured like a language” evinces that the subject 
is always split by—and indeed preceded by and therefore structured by—language, which is 
understood as the Symbolic, insofar as the subject is one who speaks (Lacan 1998 203). Insofar 
as it is barred (barred $), the signifier (and subject) is a subject who also speaks—and thus the 
subject is a subject of language. In this, the sense of communicability, ontologically speaking, 
binds the meaning of the word “with” the subject of enunciation. Lacan finds this binding in the 
word, i.e., the signifier.10 Thus, the negativity—as that which binds and also as the emptiness of 
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the thing (das Ding)—is in the word. Thus, as is the case in the Freudian tradition, the Thing as 
the archaic repressed maternal figures sense and meaning-making through the binding force of 
speech itself.11  The maternal object as more originary has to, thereby, be ‘repressed’ in order to 
move into the Symbolic social structure made up of developed (separate) individual subjects. 
The sense, however, of the wholeness (of naturalization and essentializing possibilities) of the 
subject who signifies as whole is but an imaginary construction, an idea. Lacan therefore makes 
it clear that “there’s absolutely no reason why we [psychoanalysts] should make ourselves the 
guarantors of the bourgeois dream” (Lacan 1997 7). Ontologically, therefore, such Symbolic 
efforts to designate a whatness (naturalization) of “self” are at origin grounded in a lack. 
The passage of coming-into-being is emergent from the lack at the root of Being because, 
as metonymic, the signifying chain never closes. As such, the subject communicates—through 
ontological assumption—a discursive system in the Innenwelt that is necessarily infinite and 
incomplete. Thus, the processual coming-into-being always and only emerges in relation to, and 
indeed through, the Other of language, from an anterior structure of negativity.12 Thus, the 
Symbolic serves as the rupturing force of the subject, which, as “the death instinct […] is 
constitutive of the position of the human subject” (Lacan 1988 172). Thus, the barred subject—
cut (i.e., separated but not dead) by the organizing structure of the phallic Signifier—
demonstrates the death instinct as a grounding principle, as the lack/want of being (manque à 
être) which, as an ontological principle, is only capable of articulation through its Symbolic 
formation. Because such a phallic signifier for Lacan understands recursivity to be an ordering 
power (e.g., of intelligibility) that functions as a transcendental supplement for the Symbolic—as 
a divisive cut—it is not an arbitrary occurrence. This is because “the phallus is the privileged 
signifier” and so the barred subject is condemned to the very structure the Symbolic attempts to 
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articulate, but that the phallic symbol holds the master power over (Lacan 2006 692). Emilia 
Angelova rightly demonstrates that this structuring is an overestimation of “the subject’s having 
been the slave of language, which is to say, overestimating the primacy of the symbol” 
(Angelova 2020 549, my emphasis). Indeed, the Symbolic must be “anchored in an object that is 
designated as real, a process rooted in a desire for the desire of the other—in a social other who 
initiates a symbolic order in linear time” (2020 550). The subject, therefore, only functions in 
response to the object of the symbol, i.e., is located in the signifying chain in causally determined 
linear, sequential time.  
The Symbolic thus grounds the coming-into-being of the subject, paradoxically, in an 
originary negativity of the word, which therefore leaves a wounded subject, one constitutively 
and circumstantially so, put together by the means in which it comes to represent.13 This simply 
means that there is no natural subject. Such a formulation of the subject rather demonstrates how 
the subject is mastered through the signifying structure of language itself. Indeed, Lacan tells us 
that “it is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance—it simply makes a 
barred subject out of an almost natural barrier [that is to say] pleasure as what binds incoherent 
life together, until another prohibition–this one being unchallengeable” (Lacan 2006 821). Thus, 
the barred subject—rooted in lack—functions as the first bar (the signifier barring the subject of 
signification, which is the subject in and of the socio-Symbolic domain) and the second bar, too, 
i.e., ‘prohibition’ being the ‘unchallengeable’ reality of finitude, comprising the domain of finite 
human subjectivity. This is paramount because “the function of desire must remain in a 
fundamental relationship with death” (Lacan 1997 303). Thus, the Symbolic demonstrates not 
only the ordering principle of signification in subject formation, but also the originary negativity 
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out of and through which, a signifying practice emerges, in and through the structure of 
ontological time.  
We can restate the above results on the signifying process. If “the subject depends on the 
signifier” (Lacan 1964 209), then the subject depends on engendering first and foremost, and this 
demands—for its intelligibility—a certain representability in the Borromean knotted process of 
recognition in and through language. Therefore, because the subject is preceded by the anterior 
structure of language, the structure poses a problem, which in turn generates a question toward 
the very articulability of subjectivity. The attempt is to articulate the inarticulable—which points 
to language as a cut—in turn demonstrates the (im-)possibility of so-called natural 
representation. This attempt is simultaneously also genetic (mimetic), toward grafting the phallic 
signifier as the locus for production in ontic-ontological difference.14 More strongly, if the cut 
precedes the posited subject, it thus “condemns the subject to appearing only in that division” in 
and between signification and Being. Our corollary is that a) the structure (of language) therefore 
always remains insufficient; and b) this is because structure is premised on signification which is 
necessarily bound with desire for (recognition from) the Other, as the Other of language (Lacan 
1998 210). I will now show how an alternative concern for the subject and the Other can exist in 
excess of the Symbolic, and that this excess takes the form of a concern for the o/Other that is 
guided by the imaginary. 
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II.  Kleinian Object-Relations and Phantasy 
 
The Kleinian retrieval of Freudian negativity underscores the connection between self/Other, but 
is offered through the theory of mother-infant development in object relations. Crucially, the 
negative foundation of a Kleinian psycho-political subject formation—against the dominant 
model of egoic subjectivity—has what I want to call “being-with” always already structurally 
inscribed in its dyadic formation.15 Such psychic structure is dyadic in the first place because the 
pre-Oedipal and Oedipal object relations are always already oriented toward the world and its 
(part/whole) objects; derivatively, it therefore demonstrates the crucial position of “relationality” 
which extends beyond socially demarcated boundaries (naturalized identities such as those 
privileged in repressive bourgeois models of subject formation).16 There are, I must stress, direct 
socio-political consequences to this, which are emergent from and inherent to the anterior-
internal negativity (as differentiation) which is in fact always already operative within the socio-
Symbolic structure.  
For Klein, Freudian negativity transforms into (moral) reparation, through creative acts 
of phantasy in the imaginary. This is her revision of the Freudian developmental narrative. Here, 
then, I wish to recall the aim of this paper, which is to ultimately deepen and radicalize the 
consequences of an “anterior negativity” to demonstrate a theory of radical solidarity.17 This, as I 
argue, has to take place at the basis of how we understand subjectivity and signification as dual 
processes. Through the Kleinian formulation I demonstrate how the rupture of the death instinct 
as “anterior negativity” has the generative function of relationality which—temporally, 
ontologically—thereby inscribes the psyche in socio-Symbolic systems (i.e., the world with 
others) not predicated on an Oedipal function alone.   
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For Klein, this sense of relatedness to a world (and its “whole” objects viz. the imaginary) 
finds its primary figuration in the subject’s early object relations. Crucially, the Kleinian model 
of subject formation posits a subject not condemned to the signifying structure. Rather, at its 
basis is the observation that every sense of coming into the (historical) socio-symbolic has at its 
foundation the capacity for assimilating love and hatred in the process of relationality in the 
meaningful connection to the world, which is what then gives sense and representation in 
language in the Oedipal stage of life. This movement takes place between two developmental 
“positions”: the schizoid-paranoid and the depressive position. Klein’s construction of phantasy 
in the depressive position occurs at around six months of infancy in so-called “normal” 
development. As Hanna Segal puts it, these positions are “a specific configuration of object 
relations, anxieties and defences which persist throughout life” (Segal 1988 ix). This notion of 
“positions” allows us to carefully consider the sense of flexibility of the developmental process. 
By flexibility, I mean that Klein’s “positions” are plastic and malleable. I will now turn to the 
pre-Oedipal phase of the “Schizoid-Paranoid” position, and then to the “Depressive” position to 
demonstrate the relationality at the basis of language and psychical development. 
 
II.I. On the “Schizoid-Paranoid” Position and Splitting 
 
The “schizoid-paranoid” developmental position is characterized by persecutory anxiety in the 
pre-Oedipal stage of life. Understood through various internal and external threats, the infant 
(from birth until the six-month marker of life) encounters feelings of frustration with the absence 
of the nourishing breast, which has yet to be understood as a whole object: “mother.” Thus, it is 
not the mother-as-object to which the infant refers, only the partial object. Kristeva, on this 
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precise point, remarks that “we find, sooner (chronologically and logically speaking), if not 
objects at least pre-objects, poles of attraction of a demand for air, food, and motion? Do we not 
also find, in the very process that constitutes the mother as other, a series of semi-objects that 
stake out the transition from a state of indifferentiation to one of discretion (subject/object)?” 
(Kristeva 1982 32). To recast this observation in the affirmative, there exists, therefore, prior to 
signification and prior to whole-object relations, the partial-object of the maternal breast, which 
is simply split between good or bad (‘it is good when it feeds me, but when it is gone it is 
bad’).18 Because this precarious positionality occurs developmentally prior to (although returns 
to this position are in fact possible, as in for instance psychosis) a more organized egoic 
subject/object distinction, its affirmation allows the “schizoid-paranoid” position to give the 
grounds for symbol-formation and therefore communicability. Such a dynamic reveals that from 
the earliest stages of infancy—which crucially take place before the integration of the ego—the 
infant is capable of constructing the basis for introjective and projective functions in integration 
(of the partial object) and of primordial evaluations of “good” and “bad” values. Kristeva’s 
recovery of this pre-Oedipal “binary logic” in abjection will offer its semiotic correlate in 
linguistics as “a primal mapping of the body” which, “while being the precondition of language, 
it is dependent upon meaning, but in a way that is not that of linguistic signs nor of the symbolic 
order they found” (Kristeva 1982 72).  
Klein’s “Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States” (1935) evinces 
that  
 
the baby projects its own aggression on to these objects that it feels them to be ‘bad’ 
and not only in that they frustrate its desires: the child conceives of them as actually 
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dangerous – persecutors who it fears will devour it, scoop out the inside of its body, 
cut it to pieces, poison it […] These imagos, which are a phantastically distorted 
picture of the real objects upon which they are based, become installed not only in 
the outside world but, by the process of incorporation, also within the ego (Klein 
1975 262, my emphasis). 
 
As such, the schizoid-paranoid position takes as its mooring points in and to the world partial 
objects (i.e., the good or bad breast as standing for abundance or annihilation, respectively, but 
not yet the “mother” as a whole object). The child therefore has a directedness to the world from 
the outset, but it is fragmentary and disorganized, albeit still connected. As Kristeva notes, the 
infant is capable of “object relations” (with part objects) “before” the object relationship to the 
“total object” following the “depressive position.” “Repairing,” i.e., loving, speaking, and 
thinking then become possible” (Kristeva 2010 210). 
This sense of relatedness, however, is crucially dyadic through the mother-child, marking 
a clear revision of the privileged Freudian—and indeed Lacanian—subject. Furthermore, as 
Jacqueline Rose notes, this dyadic formation functions “against the idyll of early fusion with the 
mother […] Klein offers proximity as something which devours” (Rose 2011 63, my emphasis). 
Thus, the psychic correlate of the death instinct, manifesting as anxiety (i.e., the persecutory 
fear), is the annihilatory fear of the (early, undeveloped) ego, which, upon mastery of the anxiety 
(and successful integration of the ego), allows the subject to move into the “depressive position.”  
Klein’s “Notes on some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946) clearly demonstrates the role of 
splitting in the early development of the child: 
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I have often expressed my view that object-relations exist from the beginning of life, 
the first object being the mother’s breast which to the child becomes split into a good 
(gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast; this splitting results in a severance of love 
and hate. I have further suggested that the relation to the first object implies its 
introjection and projection, and thus from the beginning object-relations are moulded 
by an interaction between introjection and projection, between internal and external 
objects and situations. These processes participate in the building up of the ego and 
super-ego and prepare the ground for the onset of the Oedipus complex in the second 
half of the first year (Klein 1975 99).  
Kleinian splitting posits that the role of phantasy (in the modes of introjection and projection) 
generates a sense of understanding language and sociability, and therefore carries with it a sense 
of relatedness to the world. The role of phantasy at the stage of the acquisition of language and 
ego-formation (from three months onward of the child’s development) rearticulates the 
severance between these so-called binaries privileged in Oedipal discourses between origin and 
ground, object and ego, inner and outer, nature and culture by giving meaning to the placeholder 
of signification.19 During the depressive position, the ego is integrated as formed and distinct, 
and thus the child is capable of experiencing the other as a whole object, which drives the force 
of reparation: as Klein puts it, “not until the object is loved as a whole can its loss be felt as a 
whole” (Klein 1975 264). This is crucially because “the child at six months was capable of 
experiencing the loss not just of a part object like the breast but of a whole object” (Miller 2014 
139). The depressive position therefore gives meaningful connection to world and others as 
whole objects, which thus becomes the source for reparation. 
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II.II. Melancholia and Klein’s Depressive Position 
 
Thus, the pre-Oedipal orientation of the “schizoid-paranoid” position is succeeded (in so-called 
normal development assuming the Symbolic) by the “depressive” position. The depressive 
position critically comes onto the developmental scene at the same time as the capacity for 
language and is characterized by the ability to integrate whole objects (i.e., the part-object breast 
is now understood as “mother”). This therefore demonstrates the possibility of the signifying act 
in the meaningful phantasmatic production—made possible due to the grounding negativity of 
the death instinct—in the reparative (protolinguistic) gesture.  
Klein radically posits the negativity of the death instinct as a grounding concept in early 
dyadic mother-child relations. This psychic negativity in Kleinian object-relations theory 
demonstrates coming-into-being as emergent from anterior negativity, which posits—much like 
Lacan’s account in the above section, though differing in crucial respects concerning the role of 
the imaginary—the death instinct at the basis of subject formation. Developmentally, the 
depressive (and reparative and linguistic) position for Klein, occurs around the same time as the 
Lacanian mirror stage.20  As Kristeva notes in her work on Klein, Lacan “likened” Klein’s 
“depressive position” to his own “mirror stage” in the sense that both concepts attest to “the 
characteristically imaginary nature of the function of the Ego in the subject. He also paid tribute 
to ‘Melanie Klein’s genius’ in having ‘reconstructed’ the ‘depressive core’ that is ushered in by 
the death drive” (Kristeva 2001 228). Crucially the formation, or formulation, of sense through 
language in Klein’s account is figured differently than the Lacanian Symbolic: in Klein’s 
formulation, the Symbolic is linked through phantasy (in imagination) in the “depressive” 
position. Phantasy in the depressive position is therefore the central focus for sense and 
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reparation, and therefore a relationality that can ground social solidarity. For, as Angelova 
rightly demonstrates, “imagination enables sublimation, substitution, transference, and 
rehabilitates the singularity and infinity of the loving imaginary third, within language: it does 
with speech what cannot be done with violence, transforming loss into intrasymbolic gain” 
(Angelova 2020 556). Indeed, without phantasmatic life the possibility of signification is 
unthinkable. 
As Rose makes clear, with Klein “we find something negative, unavailable for celebration 
or release” (Rose 2011 65). This is the “anterior negativity” of the death instinct which thus 
denotes a limit to the subject and the psyche in representation. This limit, however, for Klein, is 
generative of “reparation” viz. the process of sense and meaning making in socio-Symbolic 
inscription. Thus, “death for Klein was meaning” (Rose 2011 69). Indeed, experience allows the 
structure of subjectivity in the child to take form, through phantasy. Phantasy, in the Kleinian 
vocabulary, develops in the depressive position (which, to be sure, is not to be taken in the 
clinical sense of the term). This technical term in Kleinian theory attempts to articulate the sense 
of loss of the archaic maternal, which in turn, as a loss, grounds the relationship the infant has to 
the world and signification (indeed, it’s very sense of autonomous subjectivity). The depressive, 
melancholic position therefore involves efforts to renounce the loss of the object (the archaic 
mother, no longer split into partial objects) in order to move into the symbolic order of (social) 
life. Indeed, “the maternal semiotic is repressed in order to inaugurate social relations that take 
precedence over it and that are prerequisites for adult life” (Angelova 2020 546).  
To be sure, imaginary phantasy emerges from the centrifugal negative force, found in 
Klein’s “depressive” position which gives way to reparation through phantasy. Thus, the 
melancholia characteristic of the “depressive” position—through phantasmatic life—gives 
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meaning in language and to the world—without which the possibility of signification is 
unthinkable. Indeed, as Angelova demonstrates:  
Melancholy is an effort at separation, at releasing the hold on the maternal thing, 
das Ding (the archaic maternal) […] the question is under what conditions the 
maternal thing becomes a word, insofar as it becomes word (ein Wort) […] this 
condition cannot be the linguistic symbol: the maternal thing cannot be symbolized 
yet must be spoken. This conundrum drives melancholy […] in melancholy, what 
cannot be symbolized or separated from, is an undead mother, buried alive, a 
matricide, or a phantasm of the buried mother within language […] melancholy 
concerns a separation from a dreamlike disruption, a dream (Traum) and trauma 
that is crucial to every symbolic meaning-making, yet threatens to breach that very 
order of meaning-making, and even linear time, since this traumatism cannot be 
located in any sort of designatable meaning or symbolic law (Angelova 2020 554, 
my emphasis).  
To be sure, such subject formations come through language—in the sense that they pass 
through the Symbolic—but the Symbolic functions for Klein (notably in a critically different 
way to the Lacanian schema) because of the inseparability of phantasy from the development of 
the depressive position. As Kristeva makes clear, in that Lacan does distinguish “between the 
real, the imaginary, and the symbolic,” he does so “precisely so they can be joined together, 
[which] thus represents a considerable step forward” (Kristeva 2001 174, my emphasis and 
addition). Ultimately though, in order to arrive at the sense of concern for the o/Other as always 
already inscribed as the unconditioned future anterior of an ever diachronous semiotic structure, 
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a more radical sense of dyadic subjectivity will have to be foregrounded than the Lacanian 
formulation of mimesis and the mirror-stage.21 Because such a dyadic formation of individuation 
temporally figures the production of sense (via the phantasmatic life of the imaginary in the 
depressive position) then the rupturing force of the death instinct functions through its inscription 
in the unconditioned future-anterior of the subject.  
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III. Dual Signification of Socio-Symbolic Representation in Julia Kristeva 
 
To recapitulate: in the above sections, I have sought to articulate the interactive dimension 
between signification and subject formation, emphasizing the differential structure of “anterior 
negativity.” First, beginning in the Freudian formulation, the death instinct as negativity gives 
the originary sense of the telic rupture necessary for the preservation of psychic life (and, indeed, 
for ontologically distinguishing between subject/Other). Second, we were able to ontologically 
expand the theory of psychic life through language, found in the Lacanian introduction of the 
Symbolic. Such Lacanian developments of the Symbolic importantly demonstrate the possibility 
of a linguistic function of the unconscious in the speaking subject, however, they ended up 
offering a rather limited view of the imaginary in psychic life, whereby the Symbolic asserts 
precedence by foregrounding the (egoic) subject placed under mastery of the object of the phallic 
signifier. Third, in the Kleinian development, the function of anterior negativity gave a more 
radical sense of meaningful (partial/whole) object relationality, and thus to the world and the 
o/Other through pre-Oedipal and Oedipal developments.  
In the section which follows, I show how Kristeva’s recovery of both the Lacanian 
Symbolic and Kleinian Imaginary underscores the “anterior negativity” at the heart of signifying 
practise and subject formation but expands such processes through the diachronous temporality 
of the semiotic, thusly expanding—ontologically and politically (in the sense of politics)—the 
Symbolic to the social-semiotic body. This sense of negativity yields—through the logic of 
semiotic repetition as a breaching rupture—Symbolic representation of the subject (of language) 
as creatively figured; and it so becomes demonstrative of an ethical concern for the alterity of the 
Other. This latter is shown to be precariously yet ontologically inscribed in the very processes by 
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which such representation can take place, which are not merely Symbolic alone but depend on 
semiotic support. Therefore, Kristeva’s revision of Lacanian signifying practice (which, to recall, 
condemns the subject to the order of the Symbolic) offers an expanded “theory of signification 
based on the subject, his formation, and his corporeal, linguistic, and social dialectic” (Kristeva 
1984 15). She therefore ontologically and politically expands the Lacanian Symbolic to the 
social by offering the semiotic (as an “anterior negativity”). The sustaining force of the semiotic 
in the Symbolic is given through the precise temporal function of abjection, which is a logic of 
repetition driven by the phantasy of the repressed archaic maternal: das Ding. I first demonstrate 
the semiotic function, and then I will be able to give the development of abjection.  
 
III.I. Revolution in Poetic Language: The Social, and the Semiotic χώρα 
 
In Revolution in Poetic Language (1974), Kristeva evinces that “linguistic changes constitute 
changes in the status of the subject—his [sic] relation to the body, to others, and to objects” 
(Kristeva 1984 15).22 Thus, speech and language are also material (i.e., socio-historic) processes 
of signification. This materiality refers to the meaning and sense-making practices that are not 
necessarily—or not yet—of a discursive function. This therefore means that while the subject in 
and of Symbolic representation is produced in a system of signification that demonstrates the 
inscriptive mark of the subject’s speaking, embodied, and social being, the subject is not limited 
to the Symbolic alone. For Kristeva, this is primarily demonstrated through speech in 
psychoanalytic and poetic practices. These creative modalities of speech demonstrate the 
linguistic foundations as malleable—through semiotic practices—without which there would be 
no social discourse.  
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In preliminary terms, the semiotic refers to (non-/pre-) verbal forms of speech. In 
Kristeva’s work it is the subtending rhythmic, intonational, and sensuous support of the 
Symbolic function of social discourse. Given the ontological status of the Symbolic system to 
which the semiotic corresponds and thusly extends, it means that language cannot be merely 
concerned with speech acts or the purely denotative form of language alone. The semiotic 
demonstrates that, while the subject—and her relation to the o/Other and the world and its 
(partial and whole) objects—emerges through the very form of language, thusly underscoring the 
socio-Symbolic implications, language is also a quasi-intentionality inherent to the socio-
Symbolic structure that in fact precedes and supports it. Thus, such systems are co-constitutive of 
how we access the world with others, and its representation. This representation, while 
necessary, is in fact open to other modalities of enframing due to the precise function of semiotic 
negativity. Kristeva variously refers to the disruptive function of semiotic negativity as that 
which “breaches” the Symbolic.23  
The semiotic breaching expresses a precise signifying mark that, as an affective trace, 
ruptures (from within) the Symbolic order. It is heterogeneous, ever shifting, and always 
subtending the Symbolic representation of language. Kristeva recalls Plato’s χώρα (khôra) from 
the Timaeus, but politically extends its ontological status through the (social) function of 
language, which is not limited to speech, merely. The semiotic χώρα is a generative anterior 
negativity which therefore opens up the possibility of creative rupture in the process of 
signification. But, because such a rupture is symbolically inscribed, it is therefore social and 
capable of hermeneutical interpretation. This means that the Symbolic—as the ordering principle 
of signifying mastery which gives the subject representational value—cannot be limited to the 
signifying structure alone, because of the materiality of the semiotic (i.e., that the signifying 
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structure is always a social one). This materiality, however, must always be figured through the 
Symbolic and so cannot stand for the force of materiality alone.  
The negative semiotic ruptures the stable form of Symbolic representation (i.e., 
unchanging over time and exclusionary) that presents as object to the unified egoic subject 
privileged in the Western philosophical tradition. Such an approach considers “negativity as the 
trans-subjective, trans-ideal, and trans-symbolic movement found in the separation of matter, one 
of the preconditions of symbolicity, which generates the symbol” (Kristeva 1984 117, my 
emphasis). As such, this generativity in the anterior negative structure means that such processes 
of representation cannot be exclusionary nor determined in linear sequential time under the 
auspice of a Master Signifier. 
The semiotic, due to a mimetic signifying process other than Lacan’s but affinitive with 
Freud and Klein, therefore generates a disruptive force to the psycho-linguistic structure that it 
exceeds, and yet it functions within. It thus depends on the Symbolic but is also disruptive of the 
seeming stability of the very form that structures it, and that it structures. The structure is 
therefore not fixed. For Kristeva, there is a closed system of semiotics anterior to the Symbolic.  
This anteriority must rest on the psychoanalytic unconscious (i.e., negativity) so that it can lay 
bare the way in which the illusory stability (or totality) of the sign (referring to the denotated 
object of representation consisting of the signifier and signified) and the subject (of both 
conscious and unconscious processes) interact on unstable grounds.  This unstable ground 
conditions—and exceeds—the representational structures that support it. As Kristeva makes 
clear, the “positing of the semiotic is obviously inseparable from a theory of the subject that 
takes into account the Freudian positing of the unconscious” (Kristeva 1984 30). This sense of 
the unconscious takes seriously the role of “anterior negativity” which is classically considered 
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as the repressed archaic maternal. Therefore, the conception of the egoic linguistic subject is 
rendered illusory, in both its transcendental and empirical optics.  The semiotic functions, as 
Kristeva argues, by “decentering the transcendental ego, cutting through it, and opening it up to a 
dialectic in which its syntactic and categorical understanding is merely the liminary moment of 
the process, which is itself always acted upon by the relation to the other, dominated by the death 
drive and its productive reiteration of the “signifier” (Kristeva 1984 30).  
To be sure, under the (post-)structuralist conditions which I follow, for Kristeva, the sign 
becomes a nodal point for so-called cultural (i.e., socio-historical) analysis. Such semiotic 
motility, holding together the sign, destabilizes the possibility of a Symbolic origin of 
homogeneity by questioning the supposed totality of the sign as a stable referent by showing 
how the logic of the sign functions by “repress[ing] the chora and its eternal return” (Kristeva 
1984 14, my addition). This demonstrates how the materiality of the signifier in diachronous 
time (in which History itself is grounded) mobilizes the semiotic ruptures in and of the social-
Symbolic order, providing the sense of malleability to the synchronic function of sequential 
Symbolic processes. Such a semiotic negativity as an anterior heterogeneous occurrence—which 
has at its basis an ontological recursivity to signifying power—therefore means that the 
processes of signification and subject formation become differing structures which temporally 
have a future-anterior diachrony governing the logic of production. This future-anterior 
diachrony is propelled by the repetitious return of the repressed archaic maternal, demonstrated 





III.II. Abjection and the (Social) Body 
  
Abjection gives the condition of “of the speaking being, always already haunted by the Other, to 
divide, reject, repeat” (Kristeva 1984 11). It “confronts us […] within our personal archeology, 
with our earliest attempts to release the hold of maternal entity even outside of her, thanks to the 
autonomy of language” (Kristeva 1984 13). For Kristeva, the formulation of semiotic negativity 
that drives forth signification and subject formation is figured in and dependent upon the 
repressed archaic maternal: das Ding. By expanding the Symbolic to the maternal-semiotic of 
das Ding—which is in fact the heterogeneous precondition of and sustaining function for the 
socio-Symbolic domain—Kristeva draws out socio-Symbolic implications (thereby 
demonstrating the ontic-ontological distinction) of das Ding, driven by an “anterior negativity.”  
This leads her to place emphasis on the creativity in material- and meaning-making practices, 
thereby rendering signification and subject formation as open to change and re-articulation.24 
This is because of the precise temporal function that abjection reveals in subject formation and 
signification.25 
To be sure, the abject “cannot be assimilated,” and is “not an ob-ject facing me, which I 
name or imagine”—it is “not my correlative” (Kristeva 1982 72). In other words, the abject is 
conceived of as a pre-Oedipal process which “preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-
objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from 
another body in order to be” (Kristeva 1982 10). Logically and chronologically occurring at the 
same time as the semiotic, the abject simultaneously reveals the “return of the repressed” 
m(O)ther of language that inscriptive social-Symbolic orders attempt to (unsuccessfully) repress 
in the presentation of socially autonomous Oedipal subjects in bourgeois society in the West. 
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Kristeva organizes her argument on a triadic temporal axis.  First, while the abject thus “appears 
in order to uphold ‘I’ within the Other […] The abject is the violence of mourning for an 
“object” that has always already been lost […]” (Kristeva 1982 15).  Furthermore, it takes the 
ego “back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to be, the ego has broken 
away—it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, and death” (1982 15). Finally, in this triadic 
reconstruction, “[a]bjection is a resurrection that has gone through death (of the ego). It is an 
alchemy that transforms death drive into a start of life, of new signifiance” (1982 15 my 
emphasis).  
To summarize. In secular modernity, Kristevan abjection “becomes a substitute for the 
role formerly played by the sacred, at the limits of social and subjective identity” (1982 26).26 
These limits are the limits of negativity, which as an anterior occurrence thusly render the 
possibility of separation (and therefore of wholly determining the function of an Oedipal subject) 
an impossibility. This is due to the repetitious function of the repressed archaic maternal in 
subjective and Symbolic domains. Indeed, Kristeva makes it clear that:  
 
If language, like culture, sets up a separation and, starting with discrete elements, 
concatenates an order, it does so precisely by repressing maternal authority and the 
corporeal mapping that abuts against them. It is then appropriate to ask what 
happens to such a repressed item when the legal, phallic, linguistic symbolic 
establishment does not carry out the separation in radical fashion—or else, more 
basically, when the speaking being attempts to think through its advent in order 
better to establish its effectiveness (1982 72, my emphasis). 
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In Kristeva’s theory, separation (typically from the maternal body)—as a psychic process—is a 
constitutive violence that nonetheless drives socio-Symbolic development of the subject because 
repression of this anteriority is always incomplete, or as Kristeva puts it, an “impossibility.” 
Perhaps trivially, repression’s insistence upon returning gives the concept its meaning (i.e., if 
repression didn’t return, we wouldn’t repress: the faces of “return” and “repressed” are inscribed 
on either side of a Janus-headed coin).27 This constitutive incompleteness of severance gives the 
maternal semiotic its driving force as a rupture, both from within and from an unknown Other (in 
the sense, precisely, of the real of das Ding). Thus, this sense of rupture “cannot be inscribed in a 
symbol and rather stands as a hypersign for the restorative capacity associated with the 
imaginary” (Angelova 2020 556, my emphasis). The imaginary—its phantasy, if we recall 
Klein—extends the life of the psyche beyond itself, and gives access to an alterity within, from 
the position of extended subjectivity and signification. 
Indeed, because Kristeva recovers Kleinian psychic negativity as that which gives the 
very articulation of subjectivity, and so therefore as that which is gives socio-cultural (i.e., 
Symbolic) systems their representation, then through such dual processes, we can conceive of a 
more radical sense of relationality, and therefore to the possibility of a reparative and restorative 
justice. Such relationality is always already at work in socio-Symbolic and subjective processes 
through the logic of the repressed archaic maternal. It is thus a matter of reconsidering, 







In this paper, I have sought to demonstrate the possibility of an alternative system to the 
atomized form of egoic subjectivity, away from conceptions of the subject as the derivative and 
slave to language in Symbolic representation. Without discarding the surely critical Oedipal 
development in subject formation—through the Kleinian developments of the Freudian 
schema—I showed first, how such developmental positions (viz. Kleinian pre-Oedipal and 
Oedipal positions) are in fact malleable and necessarily open to rearticulation. Such a 
developmental structure, as I have demonstrated, emerges with language acquisition. This sense 
of language, however, is not merely denotative as if the object for an egoic subject alone. In my 
second major argumentation, I draw on Kristeva to formulate the semiotic-Symbolic articulation 
of signification. This shows that language has an ontologically and politically extended sense of 
representation, thus underscoring the potentiality for an ethics of alterity. This is so because such 
structures are grounded in an “anterior negativity” which thereby inscribe the subject into socio-
Symbolic structures that are neither linearly determined nor exclusionary. As such, this 
negativity offers the foundation for a radical relationality—due to the sense of pre-Oedipal and 
Oedipal object relations in the Kleinian formulation—which offers an expanded sense of the 
Symbolic to the social in Kristeva’s semiotic theory and in abjection. The third and main point in 
my argumentation is the affirmation that the structures of subjectivity and signification, 
respectively, only function this way since they primarily emerge through ontological difference 
as a logic of production. Fourth, this latter expansion can, I hope, offer a way to see the 
possibilities for overcoming—as in the sense of time which is to come—the social-Symbolic 
structures which oppress and suppress. Overcoming in this sense offers a possibility for 
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demonstrating how the Other is always already inscribed in the psyche and in the words with 
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            1 See Kristeva 1974 p.118 on the distinction between “negation” and “negativity.” The 
former is not merely “the shadow of a false problem” but rather demonstrates a “logical 
inconsistency” which, through Freud, we discover in “the movement that produces negation and 
of which negation is only an oblique mark in the presence of consciousness.” 
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           2 By using the cosmogonical Ancient Greek term arkhe, I highlight the sense of the so-
called origin as that which is not “outside” the beginning qua origin, but as that which is inherent 
and anterior (indeed, archaic) to origin as a generative principle. 
3 While I remain weary of totalizing the tradition of French post-structuralist thinking 
(especially in the group of May ’68) I do think it can—however provisionally—be helpful. This 
is because there is a shared concern with subject-formation, temporality, and anti-capitalist 
revolutionary discord. To be clear, from a historical point of view it is apparent how the Freudian 
principle of negativity could give the generative grounds of demanding viz. the concept of 
“revolt” a creative way to reconfigure the mode of enframing the world and our approaches to it. 
On the psychoanalytic reception of the concept of the death instinct, it is especially the work of 
Klein, Winnicott, Bion, and Segal, that the Freudian concept gained its—however 
controversial—status.  
4 I am particularly indebted to the secondary literature of Angelova (2020), Beardsworth 
(2004), Kristeva (2001), Margaroni (2005), Mills (2006), Nikolchina (2004), Oliver (1993), Rose 
(1993, 2011, 2005), Sánchez-Pardo (2003), Segal (1988). 
5 I note here that I am using the death “instinct” instead of “drive” because I aim to 
dislodge the concept from its latent biologism under the latter term (as Todestrieb in “Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle”). To be sure, the Strachey translation to which I refer switches back and forth 
between “drive” and “instinct.” This is certainly important sense of the term, but I choose to use 
“instinct.” It is also in alignment with the sense that Gilles Deleuze (1967, 1968) uses the term to 
demonstrate the structural-temporal nature of its function in individuation.  
6 These repetitions are: (1) traumatic dreams in war neuroses, where trauma repeats itself 
in the dreams of war veterans following the first world war; (2) the fort-da game, where a child 
repeats—and relives in attempts to master—the painful disappearance of the mother and enacts 
her pleasurable retrieval by throwing a toy and exclaiming “fort” (which Freud interprets as 
“gone”) and “da” (interpreted as “there”) upon its return; (3) sado-masochistic sexual practices, 
which complicates the idea that one solely seeks to derive pleasure in sexual practices; (4) the 
psychoanalytic process of recounting and reliving—and thus repeating—traumatic events in 
transference between the analyst and analysand.  
7 Here, see p.30 of Kristeva’s “L’Impossibilité de perdre” (1988) on the “infantile event” 
as structural precondition of trauma, specifically in the structure of “subject/other.” This is, as 
evinced by Kristeva, reviving the point of the “original unknown” of the origin of so-called 
trauma: “ce n’est pas un événement originaire, mais un second, réactivant le premier, qui 
constitue de cet «inconnu originaire» un trauma.” I thank Emilia Angelova for pointing me to 
this work of Kristeva’s in 2018. 
8 Such forces converge in the ego—where the inner and outer worlds converge on the 
reality principle—although, the origin of the death instinct seems to lie within the super-ego as 
the encounter with the outside world takes place. It does also seem to be a function, however, of 
the ego.  
9 On this final remark, see Kristeva 1988, page 29. 
10 Lacan thus “gives language, or representation, central importance” (Rose 1993 43).  
11 See especially Lacan here on “The Freudian Thing or the Meaning of the Return to 
Freud in Psychoanalysis” (1955, especially pages 414-429 in the Écrits) and “The Object and the 
Thing” (1960, pages 101-114 of Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis). 
12 As Richard Boothby makes clear: “when Lacan insists that human desire is the desire 
of the Other, he means that it is only in and through the Other, to whom I am linked in a relation 
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of symbolic interchange, that I am able to announce to myself my own desire” (Boothby 1991 
119, my emphasis). 
13 On the circumstantial/constitutive differentiation in and of Lacanian negativity, see 
Mari Ruti and Amy Allen, Critical Theory Between Klein and Lacan: A Dialogue (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019), especially p.115. 
14 The importance of significatory articulation in its relation to Being appears to mark the 
Heideggerian questioning that propels (middle period) Lacan’s concern with ontological 
difference as a logic of production.  
           15 This is a gesture toward the Heideggerian origins of ontological-ontic production which 
I recover from the language thematic in Lacan’s middle period, which was signaled above, and is 
signaled in Kristeva. 
16 In the late period work of Heidegger’s “On the Way to Language” (1952) we find this 
reformulation of relationality, as Being-toward. 
            17 I note here that the use of “anterior” is recovered from and in reference to Angelova’s 
2020 paper. I attach this meaning throughout, beginning with Freud and the death instinct. The 
term as such is a composite—I find it in Angelova’s paper and would like to make clear that it 
does not exist as a technical term otherwise. 
18 As Allen puts it, this “is both outside and inside the ego. This means that the split object 
that’s characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position goes hand in hand with a split inside the 
ego. The result of this splitting is that the ego is disintegrated or incoherent.” See especially page 
12. 
19 As Sánchez-Pardo makes clear, because “phantasy is a concept that problematizes the 
relationships between linguistic and visual representation, the issue of origin and ground” it 
means that “the system of appearances of external coherence that we present to the world is, in 
Kleinian theory, part of a complex process of introjections and projections that also gives shape 
to our inside. Interiority and exteriority are constituted not as opposites but as intimately and 
problematically linked. In these basic spatial forms, the struggle between the life and death 
drives repeats itself ad infinitum.” See particularly page 11. 
20 Amy Allen emphasizes the potential for fruitful comparison between the Kleinian 
depressive position and the Lacanian mirror stage, noting “for Klein this isn’t just about 
recognizing the other but also about self-recognition: the infant’s recognition of its mother as a 
whole object enables it to recognize itself as a coherent ego.” See especially page 5. 
21 To be clear, the mirror-stage is a developmental stage in Lacanian theory, occurring 
between six to eighteen months. This developmental stage demonstrates the sense of self-
recognition in subject formation which includes necessarily identifying with oneself while 
simultaneously recognizing the alienation inherent to the process itself. This is because it is 
impossible to narcissistically regain wholeness with the image of reflection, because of the other. 
As Lacan puts it in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience”: “this development is experienced in a temporal dialectic that 
decisively projects the individual’s formation into history: the mirror stage is a drama whose 
internal pressure pushes precipitously from insufficiency to anticipation—and for the subject 
caught up in the lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a fragmented 
image of the body to what I will call an “orthopedic” form of its totality—and to the finally 
donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his entire mental development with its rigid 
structure. Thus, the shattering of the Innenwelt to Umwelt circle gives rise to an inexhaustible 
squaring of the ego’s audits.” See especially page 97.  
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22 I am aiming for gender neutral usage, but the translation of the original noun in French 
does not make this possible. 
23 On the specific usage of the “breach” in Kristeva’s work, see Angelova 2020 p558n13. 
This draws attention to how “the word for “breaching” in French is effraction, a juridical term 
for “breaking and entering.”” 
24 As Angelova makes clear on this connection between the semiotic and the Symbolic, 
via the logic of origins and the temporal function of the “return” (recall the Freudian formula of 
this logic, precisely): “the tension between the semiotic and symbolic in Kristeva is a matter of a 
specifically maternal semiotic that exceeds symbolization, where, however, the symbolic order 
can neither negate nor separate itself from the maternal semiotic. This tension drives psychic life 
to want to return to its maternal semiotic origins, breaching symbolic limits and this separation.” 
See especially page 544.  
25 Such a symbolic effort “of cleanly separated bodies, and negations, operates in 
retroaction upon a maternal semiotic that must be repressed—and from which we cannot, in fact, 
separate.” See especially page 546.   
26 As Beardsworth reminds us, “the failings of modern institutions and discourses have 
left the burden of connecting the semiotic and symbolic on the individual, and the suffering 
subjectivity that psychoanalytic practice encounters is the suffering of this burden.” See 
especially page 24. 
27 Jacqueline Rose demonstrates how “it is in fact a tenet of Freudian psychoanalysis that 
repression can never be absolute. If it were, the very concept of repression could not be thought” 
(See Rose 2005 221). 
